Nations Have No Permanent Friends and Enemies, They Have Only Permanent Interests

Outline

1. Introduction
2. National interest as the foundation of foreign policy
3. Historical origin and enduring relevance of the principle
4. From alliances to alignments: why friendships between states remain conditional
5. Former enemies becoming partners: evidence from history
6. Former allies becoming rivals when interests diverge
7. Economics, security and technology as modern instruments of national interest
8. Small states and the dangers of emotional foreign policy
9. Pakistan’s foreign policy: from Cold War alliances to strategic diversification
10. Pakistan–United States relations as an example of interest-based engagement
11. Pakistan–China partnership and the convergence of strategic interests
12. Pakistan–Saudi Arabia and Gulf relations: interests beyond sentiment
13. India, rivalry and the possibility of limited cooperation
14. Afghanistan and the limits of ideological or historical affinity
15. Multipolarity and the rise of strategic autonomy
16. The moral limits of pure realism
17. National interest versus opportunism
18. Principles, credibility and long-term interests
19. A pragmatic foreign policy framework for Pakistan
20. Conclusion

Essay

International politics is often described in the language of friendship, brotherhood, hostility and betrayal, yet states do not behave like individuals. They do not possess emotions in the ordinary human sense, nor can they afford to organize foreign policy around permanent affection or hatred. Governments cooperate when interests converge, compete when interests diverge and sometimes reverse positions when the international environment changes. The famous dictum that “nations have no permanent friends and enemies, they have only permanent interests” therefore captures one of the most enduring realities of international relations. It does not mean that values, history or trust are irrelevant, but it does mean that national survival, security, prosperity and strategic advantage ultimately shape state behaviour. Alliances endure only as long as they serve these purposes, while even bitter rivals may cooperate when circumstances demand it. For Pakistan, this principle is especially important because its history has often been shaped by expectations from allies, disappointments over external support and changing geopolitical alignments. A mature foreign policy must therefore be interest-based, flexible and principled rather than emotional, dependent or permanently hostile.

The idea rests upon the concept of national interest. Every state seeks, at minimum, to protect its territorial integrity, political sovereignty, economic stability and security. Beyond these basic goals, states may pursue influence, access to markets, energy supplies, technological advancement or favourable regional balances. These objectives are more permanent than particular relationships. A government may change allies, join new institutions or enter new trade arrangements, but the underlying purpose remains the advancement of national well-being. Foreign policy therefore becomes the art of adjusting relationships while preserving enduring objectives.

History offers repeated evidence of this logic. European powers that fought one another for centuries often changed alliances according to shifts in the balance of power. Britain, France, Germany and Russia were at different times enemies, competitors or partners. No relationship was fixed permanently. The same was true during the Cold War, when ideological divisions appeared rigid but strategic necessity still produced unexpected cooperation. China and the United States, for example, moved towards rapprochement in the 1970s despite profound ideological differences because both saw strategic advantage in balancing the Soviet Union. What appeared impossible on the basis of ideology became rational when interests changed.

The transformation of Germany and Japan after the Second World War is another powerful example. Both had been bitter enemies of the Allied powers, yet within a few years they became important partners of the United States and the wider Western bloc. The reason was not sudden emotional reconciliation alone. Strategic circumstances had changed. The Cold War created new security priorities, and former enemies became useful allies in containing Soviet influence. This demonstrates that enmity between states, however intense, can become temporary when a new distribution of power emerges.

The reverse is equally true. Former allies can become rivals when interests cease to align. The United States and Soviet Union cooperated against Nazi Germany during the Second World War, but once the common threat disappeared, ideological and strategic differences quickly resurfaced. Their wartime partnership transformed into decades of Cold War confrontation. Similarly, China and the Soviet Union, initially close communist allies, later experienced a serious political and strategic split. Shared ideology could not permanently overcome conflicting national interests. Such cases expose the limits of assuming that ideological similarity guarantees lasting friendship.

Modern international relations are even more fluid because national interest is no longer defined only through military security. Economic power, trade, technology, energy, supply chains, access to semiconductors, cyber capabilities and investment have become equally important. States can be security partners while remaining economic competitors, or political rivals while maintaining substantial trade. The United States and China illustrate this complexity. They compete strategically and technologically, yet their economies remain deeply interconnected. Contemporary diplomacy therefore rarely divides the world neatly into friends and enemies.

This complexity has encouraged the rise of what is commonly described as strategic autonomy or multi-alignment. Many states no longer wish to choose a single bloc permanently. India maintains close defence relations with Russia while strengthening ties with the United States and participating in the Quad. Saudi Arabia remains an important American partner while expanding relations with China and Russia. Türkiye is a NATO member yet often pursues independent positions on regional issues. Such behaviour is not necessarily inconsistency. It reflects the reality that national interests can differ across sectors.

For smaller and middle powers, this principle is particularly important. Emotional foreign policy can be dangerous because weaker states have fewer resources to absorb strategic mistakes. A country that assumes another state will always support it may neglect its own economic and diplomatic capacity. Similarly, permanent hostility towards a neighbour can restrict trade, regional connectivity and crisis management. The wiser approach is to judge relationships according to concrete interests rather than slogans.

Pakistan’s foreign policy history provides important lessons in this regard. Soon after independence, Pakistan sought security and economic support in an environment shaped by rivalry with India and the emerging Cold War. It joined Western-sponsored alliances and developed close relations with the United States. These arrangements provided military and economic assistance, but they also created expectations that Washington would support Pakistan in all circumstances. When such expectations were not fulfilled, particularly during crises involving India, disappointment was often interpreted as betrayal. Yet from the perspective of international politics, the United States was acting according to its own priorities, just as Pakistan had joined the alliances according to its own.

Pakistan–United States relations remain one of the clearest examples of interest-based engagement. The relationship became especially close during periods when Washington considered Pakistan strategically important, including the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the post-9/11 campaign in the region. When American priorities changed, the intensity of engagement also changed. Pakistan often perceived these shifts emotionally, but they reflected the broader principle that states increase or reduce cooperation according to strategic necessity. The lesson for Pakistan is not that the United States is an unreliable friend by nature, but that no major power should be expected to sacrifice its own interests permanently for another state.

The same realism should shape Pakistan’s relationship with China. Pakistan and China share one of the country’s strongest strategic partnerships, built upon defence cooperation, regional balancing and economic projects such as CPEC. The relationship has endured because significant interests converge. China values regional stability, connectivity and strategic access, while Pakistan values investment, diplomatic support and defence cooperation. This convergence has produced unusually durable ties. Yet even here, the relationship should be understood through mutual interest rather than sentiment alone. Sustainable partnerships are strongest when both sides continue to benefit.

Viewing Pakistan–China relations realistically does not diminish their importance. On the contrary, it makes them more durable. If Pakistan ensures security for Chinese personnel, improves project viability and uses Chinese investment to strengthen productive capacity, the partnership becomes more valuable to both sides. If either side expects unconditional support regardless of changing circumstances, disappointment becomes more likely. Mature diplomacy is built upon reciprocity rather than romanticism.

Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states provide another example. These ties are often described in religious and fraternal language, which reflects genuine social and historical connections. However, the relationship also rests upon clear strategic and economic interests. Pakistan values energy cooperation, investment, employment opportunities for its citizens and financial support, while Gulf states value Pakistan’s military capacity, labour force, market and regional importance. As Gulf countries diversify their foreign relations, Pakistan must also ensure that these ties evolve from dependence into mutually beneficial economic partnerships.

India presents the opposite but equally important dimension of the principle. Pakistan and India have a history of wars, disputes and deep mistrust, particularly over Kashmir. Yet permanent hostility cannot itself constitute a foreign policy objective. Even adversaries can cooperate in areas where interests overlap, such as water management, trade, climate resilience, public health or crisis prevention. Limited engagement does not require abandoning core disputes. It simply recognizes that neighbouring states cannot change geography.

This is where the distinction between interests and emotions becomes critical. A state can remain firm on strategic disputes while avoiding unnecessary confrontation in every domain. Pakistan and India have periodically demonstrated this through ceasefire arrangements, diplomatic contacts and limited economic engagement. Such interactions do not erase rivalry, but they reduce the risk that every disagreement becomes a crisis. The mature objective is not friendship for its own sake but stability where stability serves national interest.

Afghanistan offers another cautionary example. Pakistan has historically emphasized cultural, religious and strategic ties with Afghanistan, yet relations have repeatedly remained difficult. Shared religion and geography have not automatically produced aligned interests. Border management, militancy, refugee flows and regional influence have created recurring tensions. This demonstrates that ideological affinity cannot substitute for clearly defined national interests. Pakistan must engage Afghanistan pragmatically, supporting stability while firmly protecting its own security concerns.

The emerging multipolar world makes this principle even more relevant. The international system is increasingly characterized by overlapping relationships rather than rigid blocs. Pakistan must therefore avoid framing every diplomatic choice as a decision between China and the United States, East and West, or old and new partners. It should cooperate with each actor in areas where interests converge while retaining flexibility elsewhere. This is the essence of strategic autonomy.

Economic diplomacy should become central to this approach. Pakistan’s long-term interests lie in exports, investment, energy security, technological development and regional connectivity. These interests require engagement with a wide range of states. Western markets remain important, China remains a major strategic and economic partner, Gulf countries remain crucial investors and employers, while Central Asia offers opportunities for trade and energy. A foreign policy based on permanent camps would unnecessarily restrict Pakistan’s options.

However, the idea of permanent interests should not be misinterpreted as permission for opportunism. Realism does not mean abandoning principles whenever convenient. A state that changes positions constantly for short-term advantage may gain immediate benefits but lose credibility. Trust itself is a strategic asset. Countries prefer dealing with partners whose commitments are predictable, whose agreements are respected and whose policies display some continuity. Long-term national interest therefore includes reputation.

This creates an important tension between realism and morality. Pure realism argues that states pursue power and security in an anarchic international system. Yet international law, human rights, sovereignty and moral principles also shape global legitimacy. A country that pursues narrow material advantage while ignoring every principle may eventually weaken the international rules that protect weaker states. Pakistan, as a medium-sized developing country, has a particular interest in a rules-based international order because international law can provide protections that raw power alone cannot.

Principles and interests are therefore not necessarily opposites. Supporting sovereignty, opposing occupation, advocating peaceful dispute resolution and respecting international agreements can themselves serve long-term national interest. The danger lies in selective morality, where principles are invoked only when they support immediate geopolitical convenience. A credible foreign policy requires reasonable consistency.

The concept of permanent interests must also include the interests of citizens, not merely the preferences of ruling elites. Foreign policy should ultimately enhance national prosperity, security and dignity. An alliance that benefits a narrow political class while producing economic dependence or internal instability cannot automatically be called a national interest. Similarly, diplomatic prestige has limited value if it does not improve economic opportunities or national security. True national interest must be defined broadly and democratically.

For Pakistan, economic strength should become the foundation of strategic independence. A country repeatedly dependent on external financial support cannot exercise full freedom in foreign policy. Economic vulnerability narrows diplomatic choices and creates pressure to seek emergency assistance from external partners. Pakistan’s most important foreign policy reform may therefore be domestic economic reform. Strong exports, energy security, technological capability and fiscal stability would give Islamabad greater freedom to deal with all major powers on more equal terms.

Domestic political stability is equally important. Foreign policy cannot be coherent if every change of government produces dramatic shifts in external orientation. Major strategic relationships require continuity beyond party politics. Pakistan needs broad agreement on essential interests such as sovereignty, economic development, regional stability, peaceful relations where possible and strategic deterrence where necessary. Governments may differ on tactics, but national direction should remain relatively stable.

A pragmatic Pakistani foreign policy should therefore rest on several principles. It should preserve the strategic partnership with China, maintain constructive engagement with the United States and Europe, deepen economic ties with Gulf states, expand connectivity with Central Asia and pursue stability with neighbouring countries. It should avoid unnecessary involvement in great-power rivalries while remaining active in multilateral institutions. Most importantly, it should evaluate every relationship through the question of what strengthens Pakistan’s long-term security and prosperity.

The same pragmatism should apply to adversaries. Pakistan should distinguish between defending national interests and sustaining permanent hostility. Dialogue should not be viewed as surrender, just as deterrence should not be viewed as aggression. States can negotiate with rivals while preparing for security challenges. Indeed, diplomacy is often most effective when backed by national resilience.

The dictum also carries a warning against dependency. If a state believes another nation is a permanent friend, it may neglect self-reliance. It may assume that loans, weapons or diplomatic support will always arrive in moments of crisis. History repeatedly disproves such assumptions. Allies have their own domestic politics, strategic priorities and changing leadership. The strongest foreign policy is therefore one supported by domestic capability.

At the same time, believing in permanent enemies can be equally damaging. Permanent hostility locks states into rigid policies even when circumstances change. It prevents trade, limits diplomacy and encourages military expenditure at the expense of development. It can also make conflict part of national identity. A wise state remains prepared against threats but leaves room for reconciliation when interests change.

Conclusion

“Nations have no permanent friends and enemies, they have only permanent interests” remains one of the most realistic principles of international relations. History demonstrates that alliances change, enemies reconcile and ideological partners become rivals when strategic circumstances shift. What endures is the pursuit of security, prosperity, sovereignty and national influence.

The principle does not imply that friendship between states is meaningless. Trust, cultural affinity and historical cooperation can strengthen partnerships. Nor does it imply that morality should be abandoned. Values, international law and credibility themselves form part of long-term national interest. What the statement rejects is the assumption that international relationships should be governed primarily by emotion.

For Pakistan, this lesson is particularly important. Its experiences with the United States, China, Gulf states, India and Afghanistan all demonstrate that relationships succeed when interests are clearly understood and expectations remain realistic. Pakistan should neither romanticize allies nor demonize adversaries permanently.

The emerging multipolar world gives Islamabad greater room for strategic flexibility, but only if it develops the economic and institutional strength required to exercise that flexibility. A weak state may have many partners yet little autonomy. A strong state can cooperate widely without becoming dependent upon any one relationship.

Pakistan’s foreign policy should therefore move from alliance-seeking to interest-based engagement, from emotional expectations to strategic calculation and from geopolitical dependence to geo-economic strength. It should remain loyal to agreements, consistent in principles and flexible in relationships.

Friends may change, rivalries may soften and alliances may disappear. Geography may remain constant, but even geographical relationships can acquire new meanings. The only truly permanent responsibility of a state is towards the welfare, security and future of its own people.

That is the deeper meaning of the dictum: nations do not survive because others remain permanently loyal to them; they survive because they understand their interests clearly enough to adapt when the world changes.