Is Pakistan Losing Its Great Strategic Asset of the “Youth Bulge”?
Outline
Introduction
Pakistan’s youth bulge as a potential demographic dividend
Growing emigration and the distinction between labour migration and brain drain
Unemployment, underemployment and shortage of quality jobs
Wage differentials, inflation and declining economic security
Education-employment mismatch and inadequate marketable skills
Weak research, innovation and professional-growth opportunities
Merit, governance and institutional uncertainty as push factors
Quality of life and aspirations for a predictable future
Consequences of skilled emigration for Pakistan
Remittances and the economic contribution of overseas Pakistanis
Diaspora networks, knowledge transfer and the possibility of brain gain
Brain drain versus brain gain: a conditional rather than absolute judgment
Job-rich economic growth as the first retention policy
Reforming universities and strengthening the school-to-work transition
Retaining critical professionals through merit and competitive opportunities
Developing a national diaspora and brain-circulation strategy
Facilitating return migration, entrepreneurship and knowledge transfer
Managing migration rather than attempting to prevent it
Conclusion
Essay
Pakistan stands before one of the most important demographic opportunities in its history. It possesses a remarkably young population at a time when many developed countries are ageing and increasingly require younger workers. According to the UNFPA’s State of Pakistan Population Report 2025, nearly 64 percent of Pakistan’s population is below the age of thirty, making youth potentially one of the country’s greatest sources of economic productivity, innovation and social transformation. [1] Yet the existence of millions of young people does not automatically create a demographic dividend. If a country educates its youth but cannot provide productive employment, professional growth or confidence in the future, the same young population may become frustrated or seek opportunity elsewhere. Pakistan is therefore at genuine risk of losing part of its strategic youth asset through sustained emigration of skilled and ambitious workers. However, it would be equally simplistic to describe every departure as an irreversible national loss. Migration can produce remittances, global networks, investment and returning expertise. Pakistan is experiencing brain drain where valuable human capital is permanently lost, but it can convert migration into brain gain only through deliberate policies of retention, circulation and diaspora engagement.
The scale of the demographic opportunity explains why the issue is urgent. Pakistan’s Economic Survey 2025–26 places the population at approximately 252 million in 2025 and estimates that 56.9 percent of the population falls within the 15–64 working-age group. It also reports that 762,499 Pakistanis were registered for overseas employment during 2025. [2] These figures do not mean that all emigrants are highly educated or that all migration is harmful. Pakistan has historically supplied substantial numbers of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers to international labour markets. The strategic concern arises when the professionals and young people most capable of raising domestic productivity increasingly see their futures abroad rather than at home.
The first major push factor is the shortage of sufficient quality employment. The Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2024–25 estimates that the unemployed labour force increased to 5.9 million, while people aged 15–24 accounted for 44.8 percent of all unemployed persons. [3] This is particularly troubling because youth represents the stage at which education is supposed to translate into productive participation in the economy. If large numbers of young people spend years acquiring qualifications only to enter unemployment, informal work or jobs unrelated to their training, frustration is inevitable. Emigration then becomes not simply an attraction created by foreign prosperity but a response to limited opportunity at home.
Underemployment is almost as important as unemployment. A graduate may technically be employed while working in a position that neither requires his qualification nor provides a path towards professional advancement. An engineer working in routine administration, a postgraduate performing clerical work or a technically qualified worker earning barely enough to cover basic expenses may not appear unemployed in official statistics, yet the economic system is still failing to use his human capital efficiently. Pakistan’s problem is consequently not only creating jobs but creating productive and sufficiently rewarding jobs.
Income differences between Pakistan and destination countries reinforce the incentive to leave. Professionals compare not merely nominal salaries but purchasing power, savings potential and long-term security. PIDE’s analysis of brain drain in Pakistan identifies higher salaries, access to advanced technology, better living standards and more stable environments among the major attractions drawing skilled workers towards developed economies. [8] A young professional who believes that ten years of work abroad can provide financial security that may require several decades at home will naturally consider migration. Appeals to patriotism cannot permanently overcome rational economic incentives.
The education-employment mismatch further intensifies the problem. Pakistan has substantially expanded higher education, but the quantity of degrees has not always been matched by the practical abilities demanded by employers. The Higher Education Commission itself acknowledged the employability challenge in 2025 when it made supervised internships and industry-relevant professional certifications mandatory components of undergraduate education. [4] This reform reflects an important reality: universities must produce graduates who can actually perform in workplaces rather than merely reproduce academic knowledge in examinations. Where local employers complain of skill shortages while graduates complain of unemployment, the problem lies partly in the weak connection between education and the labour market.
Young professionals also leave because they seek environments in which learning continues after university. A scientist requires research facilities, a physician requires well-equipped institutions, an engineer needs technically challenging projects and an IT professional needs exposure to rapidly evolving technology. When research funding is weak, laboratories inadequate and professional advancement slow, ambitious people may conclude that remaining in Pakistan will limit their potential. The loss is particularly damaging because these are often the individuals who could otherwise become mentors, researchers and innovators for the next generation.
The problem therefore cannot be reduced to salary alone. Merit, institutional predictability and professional dignity matter enormously. A capable young person who believes that recruitment, promotion or access to opportunities depends more upon connections than competence may become alienated even when a respectable salary is available. PIDE’s analysis similarly places political and institutional stability among the considerations influencing high-skilled migration. [8] A meritocratic environment gives ambitious individuals a reason to compete domestically; a patronage-driven environment gives them a reason to compete for visas.
Quality of life also enters the calculation. Young families think about healthcare, education for children, personal security, public transport, environmental quality and access to functioning public services. Migration decisions are therefore judgments about an entire future rather than salaries alone. The government cannot realistically eliminate the attraction of richer countries, but it can reduce the number of reasons that make talented citizens feel they must leave in order to build stable lives.
The consequences of excessive skilled migration can be serious. Training a doctor, engineer or researcher requires years of investment from families, educational institutions and the state. When that professional permanently relocates abroad, much of the productive return on this investment is captured by another economy. The World Bank notes that high-skilled migration becomes brain drain when the losses to the origin country exceed the benefits obtained through remittances and knowledge spillovers, and that the danger is especially significant in essential occupations such as healthcare. [6] Pakistan should therefore be particularly concerned about sustained losses from sectors where domestic shortages already exist.
Brain drain also produces effects that are difficult to measure financially. Senior professionals train juniors, researchers build institutions and entrepreneurs create employment for others. When a highly capable person leaves, the country may lose not only one worker but the future teams, businesses and innovations that individual might have developed. This is why remittances alone cannot fully settle the debate.
Nevertheless, the economic contribution of migration is enormous and cannot honestly be ignored. Pakistan received a record US$41.6 billion in workers’ remittances during FY2025–26, an increase of 8.6 percent from the previous fiscal year, according to State Bank of Pakistan data reported by the Associated Press of Pakistan. [7] These inflows support millions of households, finance consumption and education, provide foreign exchange and reduce pressure on Pakistan’s external account. Overseas employment also reduces pressure on a domestic labour market that cannot immediately absorb everyone seeking work.
Migration can produce benefits beyond money. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2023 explains that origin countries can benefit from migrants through remittances, knowledge transfers, business networks and greater integration with the global economy. It specifically recommends that sending countries make migration part of their development strategy rather than treating it simply as a problem to be stopped. [6] A Pakistani software engineer working in Silicon Valley, doctor working in Britain or entrepreneur operating in the Gulf can remain economically and intellectually connected with Pakistan even without permanently returning.
Academic research supports this more nuanced interpretation. Docquier and Rapoport’s major review of the economics of brain drain concludes that high-skilled emigration need not always reduce the human-capital stock of the country of origin and can generate beneficial diaspora and network effects under certain conditions. [9] Earlier research by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport found evidence that the prospect of skilled migration can encourage greater investment in education, producing what is sometimes called a “beneficial brain drain”; however, their analysis also found more losing countries than winning ones and demonstrated that outcomes vary greatly according to circumstances. [10] The slogan “brain gain” is therefore possible, but it is not automatically true.
For Pakistan, this distinction is decisive. I do not fully agree with the statement that the current phenomenon is simply “brain gain rather than brain drain.” It is partly brain gain when migrants send remittances, create business links, acquire advanced skills and eventually transfer knowledge or investment home. It remains brain drain when doctors, scientists, engineers and other scarce professionals permanently leave and their expertise is neither replaced nor connected back to Pakistan. The correct objective is therefore not to choose rhetorically between the two terms but to transform one-way brain drain into two-way brain circulation.
The first requirement is a job-rich growth strategy. No government programme can retain talented young people if the economy itself does not create enough productive work. Pakistan must expand sectors capable of absorbing educated youth, including information technology, engineering, export manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, agribusiness, financial services and modern logistics. Growth must be driven more heavily by investment, productivity and exports so that young people encounter expanding career ladders rather than a limited number of positions distributed among an ever-growing number of graduates.
The International Labour Organization’s Decent Work Country Programme for Pakistan 2023–27 identifies employment creation, social protection, informality and youth engagement among the country’s central labour-market challenges. [5] This suggests that retention cannot be achieved merely by creating any kind of job. Young people require decent employment with opportunities for progression, security and skill development. A demographic dividend cannot be built upon a generation trapped permanently in insecure and low-productivity work.
Second, universities must become more closely connected with the economy. Industry advisory boards, structured internships, practical assessment, entrepreneurship programmes and internationally recognized certifications should become normal components of higher education. HEC’s recent reforms are an important step, but implementation must reach beyond formal compliance. [4] Universities should be judged partly by graduate outcomes and employers should participate more actively in defining competencies without turning universities into mere training centres.
Third, Pakistan must identify strategically scarce professions and design targeted retention measures. Doctors, researchers, high-level engineers and specialized technical professionals cannot always be retained through ordinary public-sector salary structures. Research grants, transparent promotion systems, competitive allowances, international training opportunities and modern professional environments may be required. The objective should not be to imprison talent within the country but to make staying professionally credible.
Fourth, merit itself must become a retention policy. Transparent recruitment, performance-based advancement and institutional autonomy can often matter as much as financial incentives. Young people must believe that competence can produce progress without dependence upon political, family or bureaucratic connections. This requires reforms extending beyond youth programmes into the functioning of public institutions and markets.
Fifth, Pakistan needs a serious diaspora strategy. Instead of measuring overseas Pakistanis mainly through remittance inflows, the state should map professional expertise and create channels through which diaspora scientists, doctors, academics, entrepreneurs and technology specialists can contribute. Online teaching, visiting professorships, research partnerships, venture-capital networks and industry mentoring can allow knowledge to circulate even when permanent return is impossible. The World Bank specifically recommends facilitating diaspora knowledge transfers and supporting migrants upon return as part of an origin country’s development strategy. [6]
Sixth, return migration should become easier and more attractive. A professional returning after ten years abroad should encounter simple business registration, recognition of foreign qualifications, predictable taxation and opportunities to invest accumulated savings productively. Returnees bringing advanced research or entrepreneurial experience could receive competitive start-up grants or access to innovation facilities. The objective should be to make returning an economically rational decision rather than merely a sentimental one.
Finally, Pakistan should develop migration partnerships with destination countries. Instead of treating overseas employment as an unplanned escape valve, it can train workers for sectors facing international shortages while simultaneously expanding domestic training capacity. Circular migration arrangements can allow Pakistanis to work abroad, accumulate capital and expertise and later return with better skills. Migration policy should therefore become part of economic planning rather than remain separate from it.
Conclusion
Pakistan is indeed at risk of losing part of its youth bulge as a strategic national asset, but the real danger is not migration itself. The danger is a domestic system that produces ambitious young people without creating enough reasons for them to remain connected with Pakistan.
A youthful population becomes a demographic dividend only when it is educated, productively employed and given confidence in the future. Pakistan’s unemployment, underemployment, skills mismatch, weak professional-growth opportunities and institutional uncertainty encourage many young workers to seek their futures abroad. When scarce doctors, researchers and engineers leave permanently, the consequences constitute genuine brain drain.
At the same time, overseas Pakistanis generated a record US$41.6 billion in remittances in FY2025–26 [7] and can provide knowledge, investment and international networks that Pakistan would otherwise struggle to obtain. Migration must therefore not be treated as national betrayal. It is frequently a rational decision made by individuals responding to global differences in opportunity.
The claim that Pakistan is experiencing “brain gain rather than brain drain” is consequently only conditionally correct. Brain gain does not occur simply because migrants send money home. It occurs when migration eventually expands Pakistan’s human capital, technological knowledge, investment capacity and global connections sufficiently to compensate for the talent that leaves.
Pakistan should therefore neither attempt to stop its young people from moving nor passively celebrate every departure because it generates remittances. It must create an economy capable of retaining more talent while building mechanisms through which those who leave continue contributing and can eventually return.
The solution lies in brain circulation: competitive domestic employment, meritocratic institutions, industry-linked education, protection of critical professions, structured diaspora networks and easier return migration. Such policies can turn mobility from a one-way extraction of human capital into a continuous exchange of knowledge and opportunity.
Pakistan’s youth bulge is a demographic window, and demographic windows do not remain open forever. If the country spends the coming decades exporting talent because it cannot use it productively, history may record the youth bulge as a missed opportunity. If it creates opportunities at home while intelligently connecting its diaspora abroad, migration can become part of the dividend rather than its destruction.
Pakistan does not need to keep every young mind within its borders. It needs to build a country in which capable young people have a reason to stay, a reason to return and, even when they live abroad, a meaningful way to remain connected to national progress.
References
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). State of Pakistan Population Report 2025. View source
Government of Pakistan, Finance Division. Pakistan Economic Survey 2025–26. View source
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Labour Force Survey 2024–25: Annual Report. View source
Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. “HEC Announces Mandatory Professional Certifications & Internships for Undergraduate Degrees,” 2025. View source
International Labour Organization. Decent Work Country Programme for Pakistan 2023–27. View source
World Bank. World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies. View source
State Bank of Pakistan / Associated Press of Pakistan. “Workers’ Remittances Soar to US$41.6 Billion during FY26,” 9 July 2026. View source
Ahsan, Henna. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). Brain Drain in Pakistan: Analyzing Trend, Causes and Consequences, 2024. View source
Docquier, Frédéric, and Hillel Rapoport. “Globalization, Brain Drain, and Development.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2012, pp. 681–730. View source
Beine, Michel, Frédéric Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport. “Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 528, 2008, pp. 631–652. View source